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1. INTRODUCTION
Overseas markets have become an economic cornerstone for
major domestic software companies.' Yet for many years, the ap-
plicability of U.S. patent law to exported software remained in
doubt. The patent statute governing the export of domestic tech-
nology, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), had never been applied in the context of
computer software. Recently, however, courts have begun to pro-
vide some guidance. 2 This Article follows the trail of legislation
and legal rulings that has led to these recent interpretations of
§ 271(f), and examines the trend that these decisions suggest
Section 2 of this Article provides background about why and
how Congress enacted § 271(f). It begins with discussions about
the limits on extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law 3 and the
inability of the judiciary to prevent patent infringers from taking
advantage of these limits, as expressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.4 Section 2
. Mr. Fisch and Mr. Allen are partners at Howrey Simon Arnold & White,
LLP in Washington, D.C. Mr. Fisch was lead trial counsel in Imagexpo, L.L.C. v.
Microsoft Corp., which is discussed in Section 5, and Mr. Allen developed certain
arguments relating to § 271(f) for that case. Special thanks are owed to others who
contributed immeasurably to the $62.3 million jury verdict in that case, especially
Kelly A. Clement, Jason F. Hoffman, and Coke Morgan Stewart.
1 See, e.g., Paul Andrews, Microsoft's Monopoly Under Siege, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003 ("The importance of foreign sales to Microsoft's rise to dominance
cannot be understated. The company's savvy ability to sell in overseas markets
has been a cornerstone of its success.").
2 See Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.3:02CV751, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15139 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2003) (interpreting § 271(f) in the context of com-
puter software); Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 626, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13482 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (interpreting § 271(f) in the context of com-
puter software), discussed infra in Section 5.
3 See generally infra Section 2.1 (discussing the refusal to apply U.S. patent law
abroad).
4 406 U.S. 518 (1972). See generally infra Section 2.2 (discussing Deepsouth and
its effects on patent law).
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also describes some of the legislative history behind § 271(f), which
is particularly significant because many courts have focused on
that legislative history in trying to understand its scope.5
Section 3 focuses on how courts have interpreted § 271(f), and
in particular examines the specific types of "components of a pat-
ented invention" 6 that have triggered courts to impose patent li-
ability under § 271(f). This Section separately evaluates those deci-
sions that address traditional mechanical components, 7 non-
mechanical components,8 and design/ method patents.9
Section 4 discusses computer software. In particular, this Sec-
tion examines whether computer code properly can be viewed as a
"component of a patented invention" for purposes of § 271(f).10
Various arguments on both sides of this debate are explicated."
Section 5 examines two recent rulings from courts interpreting
§ 271(f) in the context of computer software. In Imagexpo, L.L.C. v.
Microsoft Corp.12 and Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,13 two
federal district court judges independently concluded that § 271(f)
applies to computer code sent outside the United States for incor-
poration into computers sold abroad. While these two rulings un-
doubtedly are not the final word on this complex issue, they do
signal an important trend.14
5 See generally infra Section 2.3 (discussing how Congress dealt with the Deep-
south decision).
6 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
7 See generally infra Section 3.1 (discussing the original scope of § 271(f)).
8 See generally infra Section 3.2 (discussing the treatment of non-mechanical
devices).
9 See generally infra Section 3.3 (discussing how § 271(f) applies to design and
method patents).
10 See generally infra Section 4.1 (discussing whether software falls within the
scope of patent protection).
11 See generally infra Sections 4.2 (discussing the traditional view of software
patentability) & 4.3 (discussing an alternative view of software patentability).
12 CIV.A.3:02CV751, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2003).
13 No. 99 C 626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13482 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003).
14 To date, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not
issued a ruling addressing this aspect of § 271(f). However, in the wake of Im-
agexpo and Eolas, litigants and district courts have begun to recognize the far-
reaching consequences of these rulings. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) ("This
case presents a novel issue regarding the application of Section 271(f) with pro-
found ramifications for Microsoft and other United States software manufactur-
ers. In the end, the issue of liability under Section 271(f) for foreign replication of
infringing software supplied from the United States is a question of law ripe for
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Even more significantly, this trend represents a critical devel-
opment for the computer software industry because of the implica-
tions for foreign distribution and the global economy. In recent
years, total computer software exports by U.S. companies have av-
eraged approximately $3 billion per year.15 The Imagexpo and Eolas
jury verdicts were the two largest intellectual property verdicts in
the nation in 2003.16 Damages for foreign distribution in those
cases, which were a direct consequence of § 271(f) violations, rep-
resented a significant part of each verdict. Indeed, the significance
of § 271(f) is underscored by the fact that in the Imagexpo case, two
companies took the exceptionally rare step of jointly filing an amici
brief in support of a motion in limine in a U. S. District Court.
17
2. THE GENESIS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF § 271(F)
2.1. The Traditional Refusal to Extend U.S. Patent Law to Activities
Abroad
Traditionally, U.S. patent law was interpreted to operate only
domestically and did not extend to foreign activities.18 As early as
review by the Federal Circuit.").
15 See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.,
DIGITAL ECON. 37 tbl. 3.1 (2003) (listing U.S. software export amounts), available at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/DigitalEconomy2003.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
16 See Top 100 Verdicts of 2003, NATL L. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at S5 (listing top 100
jury verdicts of 2003). See also Victoria Slind-Flor, Living Large: Small Companies
Brought in Big Patent Verdicts, in THE YEAR IN IP ALMANAC 2003 9-10 (IP LAW & Bus.
2003) (detailing aspects of the largest patent infringement jury verdicts of 2003).
17 See Brief of Amicus [sic] Curiae in Support of Microsoft's Motion to Recon-
sider Order of August 19, 2003 Interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(0, Imagexpo, L.L.C. v.
Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.3:02CV751, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139 (E.D. Va. 2003)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief] (presenting the views of Intel Corporation and America
Online, Inc. that § 271(0 should not apply to exports of computer software).
18 The basis of the U.S. patent system is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution which grants Congress the authority to enact legislation "to promote
the progress of ... useful arts, by securing for limited times to ... inventors the
exclusive right to their.., discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The statutory
core of the patent regime is found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994), amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(amending various sections of Title 35 of the U.S. Code). The executive agency
administering the system is the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). See
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994) for a description of the USPTO's duties. The bulk of
regulations concerning the USPTO are found at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1-15a (1995). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears all appeals resulting
from patent law infringement cases, regardless of the geographic location of the
initial district court case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4), (8) (1994) for a description
of which cases the Federal Circuit hears. For a more detailed discussion of patent
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
1856, the Supreme Court made it clear that U.S. patent laws were
limited in their application to activities occurring in the United
States:
[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to,
operate beyond the limits of the United States; and as the
patentee's right of property and exclusive use is derived
from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which
the law itself is confined. And the use of it [a patent right]
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States is not an in-
fringement of his rights, and he has no claim to any com-
pensation for the profit or advantage the party may derive
from it.19
Indeed, even some of the earliest statutory language empha-
sized the essentially domestic nature of patent rights. The Patent
Act of 1870, for example, provided patent rights only "throughout
the United States and the Territories thereof." 20 Similarly, the 1952
Patent Act authorized patent infringement claims only for acts oc-
curring "within the United States." 21 Moreover, the 1952 Act pro-
vided that a patent confers a "right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States."22
Well into the twentieth century, the Supreme Court maintained
these strict territorial limits on U.S. patent law, refusing to extend
its effect to foreign activities: "The right conferred by a patent un-
which cases the Federal Circuit hears. For a more detailed discussion of patent
litigation, see generally KIMBERLY P. MOORE, ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND
STRATEGY (2002).
19 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1856); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States").
20 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870). The predecessor to
the 1870 Act, the Patent Act of 1836, did not contain such territorial language in its
grant-of-rights section. It did provide, however, that an assignment of the patent
holder's exclusive rights could be made "within and throughout any specified
part or portion of the United States." Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117,
121 (1836).
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). The Patent Act of 1952 is the most recent Act,
though it has been amended on several occasions. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(2000) for the entire 1952 Patent Act.
22 Id. § 154(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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der our law is confined to the United States and its territories, and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated of [sic] acts wholly
done in a foreign country." 23 Other courts followed suit.24
2.2. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.: A Watershed Ruling
for Foreign Application of U.S. Patent Law
As U.S. business interests expanded overseas after World War
II, the strict domestic limits of U.S. patent law began to chafe. In
1972, the Supreme Court faced a case that laid bare the full ramifi-
cations of the barriers that had been erected against extraterritorial
applications of U.S. patent laws: Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.25
Deepsouth involved a patent dispute over a shrimp deveiner, a
machine that could remove the "vein" from a shrimp "more
cheaply and efficiently than competing machinery or hand labor
can do the job."26 Indeed, Justice White began the Court's opinion
with this ode to shrimp:
Shrimp, whether boiled, broiled, barbecued or fried, are a
gustatory delight, but they did not evolve to satisfy man's
palate. Like other crustaceans, they wear their skeletons
outside their bodies in order to shield their savory pink and
white flesh against predators, including man. They also
carry their intestines, commonly called veins, in bags (or
sand bags) that run the length of their bodies. For shrimp
to be edible, it is necessary to remove their shells. In addi-
tion, if the vein is removed, shrimp become more pleasing
23 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915)
(citation omitted).
24 See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ("[A] U.S. patent grants rights to exclude others from making, using
and selling the patented invention only in the United States."); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3rd Cir. 1979) ("[Defendant's]
United States patents give it no legal power to limit foreign manufacture, use [sic]
or sale of the patented products."); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d
225, 229 (7th Cir. 1966) ("[T]he manufacture and sale in this country of parts of an
apparatus to be assembled outside the territorial limits of the United States does
not infringe a combination patent limited to the embodiment of those parts as ele-
ments in combination.").
25 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
26 Id. at 519.
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to the fastidious as well as more palatable. 27
The plaintiff, Laitram Corporation, accused the defendant,
Deepsouth Packing Company, of infringing Laitram's two patents
for shrimp deveining devices 28 by distributing infringing machin-
ery both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, Laitram al-
leged a violation of, inter alia, § 271(a)'s infringement language:
"[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States ... during the
term of the patent therefor, [directly] infringes the patent."29
The district court found in favor of Laitram and (among other
things) issued an injunction preventing Deepsouth from making or
selling its own shrimp deveiners. On appeal, Deepsouth sought a
modification of the injunction to allow it to ship components of de-
veining equipment to its customers abroad, so that those foreign
customers could assemble the deveining machines themselves. In
doing so, Deepsouth understandably sought to take full advantage
of the domestic limitations of U.S. patent law:
The company [Deepsouth] contends that by this means [i.e.,
sending ready-to-assemble components overseas, rather
than complete machines] both the "making" and the "use"
of the machines occur abroad and Laitram's lawful [patent]
27 Id. at 518-19 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp.
1037, 1040 (E.D. La. 1969)). Justice White further added that "[s]uch 'gustatory'
observations are rare even in those piscatorially favored federal courts blissfully
situated on the Nation's Gulf Coast, but they are properly recited in this case." Id.
at 519. Other commentators have also praised shrimp:
Anyway, like I was saying, shrimp is the fruit of the sea. You can
barbecue it, boil it, broil it, bake it, saut6 it. There's ... shrimp ka-
bobs, shrimp Creole, shrimp gumbo, pan-fried, deep-fried, stir-
fried. There's pineapple shrimp, lemon shrimp, coconut shrimp,
pepper shrimp, shrimp soup, shrimp stew, shrimp salad, shrimp
and potatoes, shrimp burgers, shrimp sandwich. That's ... that's
about it.
FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994) (quoting Bubba Blue).
28 Specifically, Deepsouth upheld patents on devices known respectively as a
"slitter" and a "tumbler," both of which are described in some detail in the
Court's opinion. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 520-22 (describing the types of de-
vices at issue). These patents were known as "combination" patents because al-
though none of the individual components of the devices were claimed as new,
the combination of components performed a novel function and thus could be
patented. Id. at 520-21.
29 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
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monopoly over the making and use of the machines
throughout the United States is not infringed.
30
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit")
had rejected Deepsouth's creative effort to avoid U.S. patent law,
interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to apply to "'the substantial manu-
facture of the constituent parts of the machine."' 31 Although the
literal language of § 271(a) arguably did not apply to such foreign
assembly, the Fifth Circuit had refused to limit § 271(a) to its
strictly literal terms, stating that "[s]uch a dependence on techni-
cality would require us to countenance obvious schemes, perhaps
as simple as omitting an important screw, designed to evade the
mandate of § 271(a)." 32
After analyzing the facts and the literal terms of § 271, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and instead sided with rul-
ings from the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits.33 The Court
specifically reiterated the presumption against foreign application
of U.S. patent law, finding that Congress did not intend for the
patent laws to affect overseas conduct: "Our patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect .... //34
30 406 U.S. at 524.
31 Id. at 527-28 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d
936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 518 (1972)) ("[W]e find the Fifth Circuit's
definition [of 'makes'] unacceptable because it collides head on with a line of deci-
sions so firmly embedded in our patent law as to be unassailable absent a con-
gressional recasting of the statute."). This case reached the Supreme Court via the
Fifth Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit because at that time, all federal Circuit
Courts heard appeals of patent cases. See infra note 33.
32 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
33 Notably, because the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals did not yet exist
when Deepsouth was on appeal, separate circuit courts decided patent law issues
at that time. The resulting splits among the circuits often created havoc in patent
jurisprudence. In 1982, seeking in part to promote greater uniformity, Congress
established an appellate court defined exclusively by its jurisdiction rather than
by its geographical boundaries. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 96
Stat. 25 (1982) ("An Act to establish a United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, to establish a United States Claims Court, and for other purposes.").
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction for, among
other things, patent appeals. See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003) (dis-
cussing the history and purpose of the Act).
34 406 U.S. at 531. See also id. at 527 ("The statute makes it clear that it is not
an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States.
35 U.S.C. § 271.").
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The Supreme Court held that "a combination patent protects
only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manu-
facture of its parts."35 Because the manufacturer did not combine
components into an operable assembly within the United States,
the Court refused to find any direct infringement within the mean-
ing of § 271(a). 36 The Court declined to read the patent statute as
authorizing liability for such extraterritorial conduct, insisting that
it "would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before
approving the position of a litigant who ... argues that the beach-
head of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower,
than courts had previously thought." 37 The Court further ex-
plained:
The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of
how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from
Congress. We are here construing the provisions of a stat-
ute passed in 1952.38
By declining to give extraterritorial effect to the patent laws, the
Court adhered to the presumption against extraterritoriality preva-
lent in U.S. courts at the time.39
35 Id. at 528. See also Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1966) (holding that manufacture and sale of part of an apparatus to be assem-
bled outside the U.S. was not a violation of a combination patent on the appara-
tus); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir.
1956) (holding that where no assembly took place in the U.S., no patent was vio-
lated); Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding that
there is no patent violation where the patented parts are sold and combined
abroad). But cf. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d
11, 20 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that "testing the assemblies can be... in essence
testing the patented combination and, hence, infringement" if full assembly will
occur after the patent term expires); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed.
Cl. 197, 219, 219 n.23 (Fed. Cl. 1993) (noting "significant tension" between the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Deepsouth and the Federal Circuit's analysis in Paper
Converting, and contending that Paper Converting is a narrow exception to Deep-
south's operable assembly rule).
36 See 406 U.S. at 528 (rejecting the view that a patent pertains to constituent
parts, rather than a functioning whole).
37 Id. at 531.
38 Id. at 530. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress with the
power to secure rights for inventors and authors).
39 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist,
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In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court permitted a loophole in the
patent laws to stand open by tolerating those who manufacture
component parts of a patented invention within the United States
and then ship the components overseas for assembly and sale. In
response, Congress added subsection (f) to § 271 to eliminate this
seemingly unjust result.
2.3. Congress's Solution to the Deepsouth Conundrum: § 271(0
In 1984, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) as "a legislative so-
lution to close a loophole in patent law." 40 Congress specifically
intended § 271(f) as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Deepsouth.41 Section 271(f) provides as follows:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that
Justice Blackmun argued that the majority had applied "too narrow a reading" of
§ 271(a). 406 U.S. at 532 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun expressed
concern that the loophole preserved by the majority "opened the way to deny the
holder of the United States combination patent the benefits of his invention with
respect to sales to foreign purchasers." Id. at 533. See also id. at 534 ("'The Consti-
tutional mandate cannot be limited to just manufacturing and selling within the
United States. The infringer would then be allowed to reap the fruits of the
American economy-technology, labor, materials, etc.-but would not be subject to
the responsibilities of the American patent laws.'") (quoting Laitram Corp. v.
Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)). For further analysis of
Justice Blackmun's dissent, see David Sulkis, Patent Infringement by Offer to Sell:
Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corporation, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1099, 1110 (2001)
(stating that Justice Blackmun's dissent best describes how the unauthorized
manufacture of a patented product for export violates the patent-holder's monop-
oly); Joan E. Beckner, Patent Infringement by Component Export: Waymark Corp. v.
Porta Systems Corp. and the Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. REV.
803, at 812 n.62 (2002) (quoting Justice Blackmun's criticism of the Deepsouth ma-
jority).
40 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 3383) 5827, 5828 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
271(f) (2000)); see also Stuart Watt, Patent Infringement: Redefining the "Making"
Standard to Include Partial Assemblies, 60 WASH. L. REV. 889 (1985) (discussing legis-
lative passage of § 271(f)).
41 See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5828
("[Subsection 271(f] responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in
[Deepsouth] .... ).
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would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a
patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial nonin-
fringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made
or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
42
According to the legislative history, Congress made this "major
[change] in the patent law to avoid encouraging manufacturing
outside of the United States." 43 Specifically, Congress intended the
new Section to "prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by
supplying components of a patented product in this country so
that the assembly of the components may be completed abroad."
44
Section 271(f) overrules the holding of Deepsouth and provides
the "clear and certain signal from Congress" that the Deepsouth ma-
jority had found missing in that case.45 With § 271(f), Congress
42 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). Section 271(f) contains two subsections, each of
which provides a separate basis for patent infringement liability. Liability at-
taches under subsection (f)(1) only if a supplier exports "all or a substantial por-
tion of the components of a patented invention," so long as such components are
supplied "in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such compo-
nents outside of the United States ...." 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1) (2000). By contrast,
subsection (f)(2) applies to a supplier of "any component" of a patented invention
and includes additional requirements not found in subsection (f)(1). In particular,
under subsection (f)(2), a component shipped abroad must be "especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use ...." 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(2)
(2000). Subsection (f)(2) also requires that the accused infringer "intend" that the
component will be combined outside the United States in a manner that would
infringe if combined domestically. See Beckner, supra note 39, at 817-21 (compar-
ing and contrasting subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2)).
43 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5827.
44 Id. at 5828.
45 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531.
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specifically extended the reach of U.S. patent law beyond the bor-
ders of this county.
3. THE SLOWLY MATURING INTERPRETATIONS OF § 271(F)
3.1. The Original Scope of§ 271(0: Mechanical Devices
For many years, federal courts addressed § 271(f) relatively
rarely. Indeed, as a result of the sparse caselaw interpreting
§ 271(f), some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that
§ 271(f) serves little purpose at all.46 This rarity likely results from
the narrow focus of § 271(f) to only "components" of patented in-
ventions that are supplied in or from the United States.47 Thus, at
the outset, § 271(f) applies only to patented inventions that involve
"components. "4 8
On its face, application of § 271(f) in the context of mechanical
devices seems relatively straightforward. For example, Deepsouth
itself involved a shrimp-deveining machine comprising various
individual components. 49 As a result, most of the early cases inter-
46 See, e.g., Timothy F. Myers, Foreign Infringement of Business Method Patents, 7
WILLAMETITE J. INT'L L. & DIsPuTE RES. 101, 109 (2000) (suggesting that "given the
dearth of cases interpreting [§] 271(f), it has not been of major importance").
47 Although both subsections of § 271(f) pertain to one who supplies compo-
nents "in or from the United States," courts interpreting this phrase have required
that the components actually be manufactured in the United States. See Windsurf-
ing Int'l, Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(finding that § 271(f) "would not apply here, where, in a situation not discussed in
Deepsouth, BIC Leisure shipped from the United States to Canada unassembled
sailboards which had been made in France and which had simply been stored in
the United States"), affid sub nom., BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l,
Inc., 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d
1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring) ("With no remaining compo-
nent made in the United States the application of § 271(f) was mooted, for no
component originating in the United States was included in the system that was
sold.").
48 One district court acknowledged, but did not have occasion to resolve, a
debate about "whether the term 'components of a patented invention' in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(1) refers to components of the infringing products or limitations of the in-
fringed claims." TA Instruments, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 367,
380 n.9 (D. Del. 2003). As made clear by the case law discussed infra, most courts
have construed "components" as referring to components of the accused product
or apparatus. See, e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D.
Va. 1998) ("[T]he language and legislative history of § 271(f) demonstrate an ex-
clusive focus on the sale of components patented in the United States for combina-
tion into a finished product, apparatus, or invention abroad.").
49 See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 520-21 (describing patents for a "slitter" and a
"tumbler").
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preting § 271(f) involved mechanical inventions. 50
3.2. The Middle Ground of § 2 71(): Non-Mechanical Devices
As technology has expanded beyond the relatively simple me-
chanical devices prevalent when the Supreme Court decided Deep-
south and Congress enacted § 271(f), the courts have been forced to
interpret § 271(f) in new contexts. For example, the court in WR.
Grace & Co. -Conn. v. Intercat, Inc. applied § 271(f) to patented
chemical compounds that are used to reduce sulfur emissions in oil
refining and other similar processes.51 The defendant in WR. Grace
argued that the plaintiff could not recover for sales of the infring-
ing chemical compound to foreign countries because § 271(f) "'only
covers components of machines and other structural combinations
since the section was enacted specifically to overrule' [Deep-
south]."52 In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the court focused
on the plain language of § 271(f) and emphasized that the defen-
dant could not read into the statute any limitations to mechanical
combinations:
The plain language of the statute limits its application only
to a "component of a patented invention". Nowhere in the
statute or its legislative history is there a limitation to com-
ponents of machines and other structural combinations. A
contrary holding, refusing to apply the statute to chemical
compositions, would be tantamount to legislating addi-
tional language to a statute. That simply is not warranted.
53
50 See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 590 (N.D. Okla.
1989) (applying § 271(f) in the context of a "caliper pig, used for measuring and
reporting on the internal geometry of pipelines"); Windsurfing Int'l v. Fred Os-
termann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying § 271(f) in the
context of sailboards); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28247 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1986) (applying § 271(f) in the context of complex drill
bits).
51 W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (D. Del.
1999).
52 Id. at 320 (emphasis added) (quoting Patent Law Amendments Act 1984,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828).
53 Id. at 321. See also Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH,
150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 204 n.35 (D. Mass. 2001) (agreeing with the rationale behind
extending § 271(f) to chemical compounds, but finding that the chemicals in the
case at bar were not components of a "greater, infringing compound" for pur-
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The court accordingly ruled that the defendant could be held liable
for foreign distribution under § 271(f).54
Similarly, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
the court recognized that § 271(f) applies to drug compounds.55 In
that case, the accused infringer, Bristol-Myers, sold a cancer che-
motherapeutic drug that was produced from a combination of two
chemical components.5 6 The manufacturing process involved pro-
ducing the basis for the first chemical component in New York and
then sending it to Ireland for further modification. 57 The second
chemical component was purchased from Italy and sent to Ire-
land.58 It was at Bristol-Myers' factory in Ireland that these two
components were combined to create the final chemical compound
that allegedly infringed on the plaintiff's patent.59
The patentee, Rhone-Poulenc, sued Bristol-Myers for patent in-
fringement, and moved for partial summary judgment of in-
fringement under § 271(f).60 Bristol-Myers argued that § 271(f)
"should not apply to patents for chemical compounds because
such compounds are not generally described as having compo-
nents." 61 The court rejected Bristol-Myers' attempt to limit § 271(f),
however, noting that Bristol-Myers was "unable to point to any
poses of § 271(f); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 696 F. Supp. 302, 325 (N.D. Ohio
1988) (enjoining the defendant, pursuant to § 271(f), from supplying certain lubri-
cant additives for combination outside the United States); Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001) (noting that it is conceptually difficult to apply 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) to patents for chemicals, but concluding, based on the text and leg-
islative history of § 271(f) as well as prior court decisions, that the section indeed
applies to chemical compounds), affd on other grounds, 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
54 W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
55 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *8-9.
56 Id. at *2-3. Chemotherapeutic drugs are ideally designed to "target and de-
stroy only cancer cells without adverse effects or toxicities on normal cells."
MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY
988 (Mark H. Beers & Robert Berkow eds., 1999).
57 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *2-3 (noting that a "B-
lactam side chain precursor was protected by a methoxypropyl ('MOP') protect-
ing group and subject to benzoylation .... ).
58 Id. at *3 (discussing how Bristol bought 10-DAB from Milan).
59 Id. (noting that "the protected side chain (BMS-184537) is coupled with the
protected taxol core (BMS-184260) to form protected taxol (BMS-184558)").
60 Id. at *4. Bristol subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment of non-
infringement under § 271(f). Id.
61 Id. at *6.
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language in § 271(f) or in its legislative history that supports ex-
cluding chemical patents from its reach." 62 Accordingly, the court
ruled that § 271(f) is not limited to mechanical components and
should be interpreted to apply to patents for chemicals.
63
3.3. The Outer Limits of§ 271(0: Design & Method Patents
Notably, however, several courts have refused to apply § 271(f)
to "design" or "method" patents.64 A design patent (also termed
an "ornamental patent") generally applies only to the surface or-
namentation and/or configuration of an object.65 A method patent
62 Id. at *7-8. The court further justified its conclusion that § 271(f) encom-
passes non-mechanical inventions by noting that "the term 'component' is used in
subsection (c) of Section 271 in reference to patented compositions as well as pat-
ented machines. Patented compositions, which are 'compositions of matter,' in-
clude chemical patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 101." Id. at *8.
63 See id. (noting that Congress did not intend "component" to have a differ-
ent meaning in § 271(f) than in § 271(c)). Interestingly, however, even after find-
ing that § 271(f) is generally applicable to chemical compounds, the court ruled
that Bristol-Myers could not be held liable for alleged violations of either subsec-
tion (f)(1) or subsection (f)(2). The court held that while the "plain meaning of
Section 271(f)(1) is that it only applies where multiple components have been
supplied or caused to be supplied in or from the United States," the undisputed
evidence was that Bristol-Myers had supplied only one component from the
United States. Id. at *12. In its analysis of subsection (f)(2), the court concluded
that, in fact, no component was supplied from the United States. Because the
chemical precursor that Bristol-Myers sent from New York was significantly
modified in Ireland before being incorporated into the patented invention, none of
the components ultimately incorporated into the allegedly infringing compound
originated from the United States. Id. at *14-15. Thus, one could argue that the
court's analysis under subsection (f)(1) is mere dicta, because the court viewed
none of the components as having come from the United States. Id. at *17-18. See
also Kirk T. Bradley, One Size Fits Most: The Rise of a Loophole in Extraterritorial Pat-
ent Legislation and a Proposal for Change, 2004 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 19
(2003) (suggesting that Congress should amend § 271(f)(1) to apply to "any mate-
rial component" to close the loophole identified in Bristol-Myers), at http://
www.law.wfu.edu/prebuilt/IPLJWinter2004_Bradley.pdf.
64 See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that § 271(f) was not implicated by alleged in-
fringement of a patented method for producing asphalt); Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v.
MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002) (following the lead of
other courts in holding that § 271(f) "does not protect against the foreign use of
process patents").
65 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.04 (2003) (stating that a
design may consist of surface ornamentation, configuration, or both). Although
design patents have been used in some situations to protect computer software,
the value of a design patent's protection remains speculative in relation to the ex-
pense of obtaining the patent, and it is not generally perceived as a primary
means to protect software. See Alan M. Fisch, Addressing Copyright and Patent as
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applies to a novel technique that performs a commercial function
not embodied in a specific invention.66 Method patents have be-
come quite significant in recent years as courts have recognized
their application to a wide array of situations, not least of which is
in the realm of computer software. 67
Courts have refused to apply § 271(f) to such design and
method patents because courts believe that design and method
patents lack the requisite "component" parts that typically are pre-
sent in mechanical inventions. For example, in Aerogroup Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., the district court held that
§ 271(f)(1) "does not apply to the patent at issue here, which has no
'component parts' but is rather a design patent for a shoe sole."68
Software's Legal Aegis: A Review of Software and Intellectual Property Protection, 5
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 122 n.20 (1996) (discussing speculative nature of
design patent protection for computer software). For a cogent discussion of the
software-related design patent, see Daniel J. Kluth & Steven W. Lundberg, Design
Patents: A New Form of Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 5
COMPUTER LAWYER 1 (1988) (analyzing protection afforded by design patents). See
also Lauren Fisher Kellner, Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Interface "Look
and Feel," 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1011 (1994) (discussing protection of design aspects of
computer software via trademark law). See generally Guidelines for Examination
of Design Patent Applications for Computer-Generated Icons, 61 Fed. Reg. 11381-
82 (Mar. 20, 1996) (describing public comments and setting forth USPTO guide-
lines relating to issuance of design patents).
66 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (permitting the patenting of pure business methods); see also
WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (allowing a
patent for methodology that stops slot machine reels); AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (permitting the patenting of a
method of incorporating a primary interexchange carrier as a data field); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (allowing for the patenting of software that
employed an anti-aliasing system).
67 See Kevin M. Lemley, Just Turn North on State Street and Then Follow the
Signs Given by the Federal Circuit: A Sophisticated Approach to the Patentability of
Computerized Business Methods, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (2003) (discussing various
types of business method patents in software); Raymond Van Dyke, E Wars -
Episode One: The Patent Menace, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 91 (2003) (discussing
how to proceed in protecting a business method patent); Philip J. Weiser, The
Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 578
n.179 (2003) (highlighting some of the difficulties in the application of business
method patents). For an additional look at the issue, see Seth Shulman, Software
Patents Tangle the Web, TECH. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 68 (providing statistics on
the rise of computer related business method patenting as well as a discussion of
issues arising from the patenting of such); Scott Thurm, Amazon.com Chief Execu-
tive Urges Shorter Duration for Internet Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2000, at B3 (dis-
cussing proposal by Amazon.com to shorten the life cycle of software and busi-
ness method patents from 17 years to only 3-5 years).
68 955 F. Supp. 220, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Likewise, courts have held that method patents do not implicate
§ 271(f) because they lack any "components." 69
An example of one court's refusal to apply § 271(f) in the con-
text of a pure method patent involving computer software is found
in Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.70 In Enpat, Microsoft argued that its
foreign sales of allegedly infringing software could not trigger li-
ability under § 271(f) because the plaintiff's pure method patent
encompassed no component parts to be assembled abroad. 71 Mi-
crosoft claimed that the pure method patent at issue in Enpat
merely described the steps for accomplishing a particular task,
much like the process for making asphalt 72 or the design of a shoe
sole,73 rather than the composition of a patented product.74 The
court in Enpat agreed with Microsoft's analysis, further noting that
distinctions between § 271(f) and § 271(g) lent further support to
Microsoft's arguments: "Clearly, had Congress intended to pro-
hibit U.S. companies from exporting products which allow foreign
companies to make unauthorized use of patented methods, it could
have done so in clear, unambiguous language like that found in
§ 2 71(g)." 75
Some courts seem purposefully to have avoided interpreting
whether § 271(f) can apply to non-mechanical devices, possibly be-
cause of the complexity inherent in this analysis. In Fieldturf, Inc. v.
Southwest Recreational Industries, for example, the defendant manu-
factured, sold, and installed artificial turf systems that allegedly in-
fringed the plaintiff's patented system.76 The plaintiff's patent
claimed a "playing surface for athletic games" composed of four
elements: a subsurface, a pile fabric, a top-dressing layer of resil-
69 See, e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va.
1998) (finding that a patented method "has no 'components' for purposes of
§ 271(f)"); Standard Havens Prods., 953 F.2d at 1374 (holding that § 271(f) was not
implicated by alleged infringement of a patented method for producing asphalt);
Synaptic Pharm. Corp., 265 F. Supp. 2d at 464 ("[Section 271(f)] does not protect
against the foreign use of process patents.").
70 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998).
71 Id. at 538.
72 See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (discussing patent liability for the methodology used in asphalt produc-
tion).
73 955 F. Supp. at 220.
74 6 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
75 Id. at 539.
76 235 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
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ient particles, and sand.77 The defendant's allegedly infringing
playing surfaces were combined overseas, and only the "pile fab-
ric" component was supplied from the United States. 78
The court in Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries
never assessed whether the defendant's overseas combination in-
fringed the plaintiff's patented invention because the court held
that supplying only one component of the accused system would
not trigger § 271(f)(1).79 Thus, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claims
with prejudice.
80
4. THE COMPLEXITY CREATED BY COMPUTER SOFTWARE
4.1. Is Computer Software a Component, or Not?
The rapid rise of computers as indispensable tools in the busi-
ness and scientific community, and indeed, in daily life, has neces-
sitated the rethinking of many legal constructs related to computer
software.81 Recent estimates suggest that the USPTO has issued
close to 100,000 patents for software or software-related inventions,
and many more are being issued every year.82 In many instances,
77 Id. at 713 n.3.
78 See id. at 733 ("[T]he pile fabric was custom made by Defendant in the
United States for overseas AstroPlay@ installations and installed in at least 99 of
100 installations in Europe.").
79 See id. at 733 (stating that "the Court is convinced that exporting a single
component.., of a patented invention abroad will not rise to the level of provid-
ing 'a substantial portion of the patented invention'"); see also Bradley, supra note
63, at 20 (suggesting that Congress should amend § 271(f)(1) to apply to "any ma-
terial component" to close the loophole identified in Fieldtur).
80 235 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
81 Numerous books and articles delve into the many changes that computers
have worked on the law, and specifically on the intersection of patent law, com-
puter software, and cross-border business. See generally Robert C. Laurenson, The
Application of 35 U.S.C. §271(g) to U.S. Manufactured Products, 20 NEW MATrER 13
(1995) (concluding that "[p]ractitioners should carefully consider the application
of [§ 2 71(g)] to infringement actions involving manufacturers, integrators, and dis-
tributors of U.S. manufactured products"); Robert C. Laurenson, The Extra-
Territorial Scope of U.S. Injunctions, 20 NEW MATTER 28 (1996) (arguing that U.S.
patent laws have an extraterritorial effect); John M. Taladay & James N. Carlin, Jr.,
Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Under the Competition Laws of the United
States and European Community, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 443 (2002) (discussing con-
flicts between intellectual property and antitrust considerations in the context of
foreign distribution of computer software and other patented articles).
82 See Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-12, 11-12 n.33 (2001) (noting that several thousand
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intellectual property law has struggled to keep pace with these
technological developments. 83
Unlike most traditional mechanical tools, the stock-in-trade for
computers is intangible information.84 Assessing the legal com-
plexities associated with computer software requires a basic un-
derstanding of how software is commonly distributed abroad.
Most large-scale domestic software manufacturers send their
product outside the United States by using a "golden master" disk
that contains the software.85 Then the exporting software devel-
opment company's foreign agents simply duplicate software from
new software and software-related patents are being issued every year).
83 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (stating that shifts in technology have made the
current system of intellectual property rights unworkable); Robert C. Laurenson,
Computer Software 'Article of Manufacture' Patents, 21 COMPUTER L. REP. 965 (1995)
("[T]he copyright laws, perceived by many to be the most appropriate means for
achieving protection of computer software, are inadequate."); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Copyright Protection for ASIC Gate Configurations: PLDs, Custom and Semicustom
Chips, 42 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1989) (discussing the application of intellectual prop-
erty law to hardware and software); Glenn W. Rhodes et al., US Expands Pat-
entability of Software and Business Methods: Can There Be Patents on Familiar Ways to
Solve Business Problems?, IP WORLDWIDE, Jan./Feb. 1999 (noting that U.S. courts
struggle with applying patent law to computer programs); Pamela Samuelson et
al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2308 (1994) (suggesting that existing intellectual property regimes are inade-
quate to deal with computer software issues and recommending an alternative
legal regime to deal-with those issues).
84 For analyses of the challenges that intangibles present to commercial law,
see Michele C. Kane, When Is a Computer Program Not a Computer Program? The
Perplexing World Created by Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1013,
1015-16 (1998) (criticizing distinctions in proposed Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") amendments between informational content and functional content in
computer software); Raymond T. Nimmer, Symposium on Intellectual Property,
Digital Technology & Electronic Commerce: The Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act and Electronic Commerce: Licensing in the Contemporary Information Econ-
omy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 113-15 (2002) (asserting that, unlike traditional
tangible media, the computer industry deals in intangible information); see also
Patrick Thibodeau, Sponsor's Surrender Won't End UCITA Battle, COMPUTERWORLD,
Aug. 11, 2003, at 7 (reporting on the failed efforts to adopt U.C.C. amendments
relating to computer software).
85 See Heather Meeker, A Lesson in Taxonomy: The Many Monikers of the Soft-
ware Distribution Agreement, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Nov. 1999, at 3 (outlining
"some of the differences between the various kinds of commercial distribution
agreements, to help software suppliers (and their attorneys) consider what type of
agreement the suppliers need."); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 40 (D.C. 1999) (noting that Microsoft refused to release its Windows 95"golden master" code to IBM, a move which stymied IBM's product planning and
development).
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the "golden master" disks.86 After duplicating the software, a
software company's customers "assemble" the patented "appara-
tus" by either installing or using the software on the general pur-
pose computer. It is this "apparatus" of software-plus-computer
that becomes the device that infringes on a patent.
Against this factual backdrop, many legal arguments have de-
veloped in the clash over whether § 271(f) should apply to com-
puter software.
4.2. The Traditional View: Arguments Against Viewing Software as a
Component
Under § 271(f), liability can be imposed for supplying a "com-
ponent" of a patented invention to be combined with other com-
ponents to form the patented invention overseas. 87 Understanda-
bly, any company accused of infringing on a patent involving
computer software will argue that § 271(f) is not applicable in or-
der to minimize potential liability. Companies arguing that soft-
ware cannot be viewed as a "component" under § 271(f) may raise
a number of arguments to claim that computer code is not a tangi-
ble item and thus cannot be viewed as a "component" of an ac-
cused apparatus within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). While it
is impossible to divine every possible argument that creative law-
yers might develop, this Section will describe some of the more
common arguments that are seen in practice. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to pass judgment on the relative merits of
these arguments, but as will be seen in Section 5, various courts
have begun to consider whether these arguments hold water.
4.2.1. Argument One: The Definition of the Word "Component"
in § 271(f) Logically Cannot Encompass Computer Software
One literal point of attack for an accused infringer is to claim
that the word "component" as used in § 271(f) covers only tangible
items that physically become a constituent part of a patented appa-
ratus because the plain meaning of the word "component" requires
that an item be a "constituent part" of a whole. Although the term
"component" is not specifically defined in § 271(f), a company
86 See Michael A. Cusumano & Richard W. Selby, How Microsoft Builds Soft-
ware, COMM. OF THE ACM, June 1997, at 54, 56, fig. 2 (giving an overview of Micro-
soft's development approach, including its release of "golden master" disks).
87 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
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seeking to avoid liability for patent infringement may claim that
the standard definition of the word "component" supports its ar-
gument. This literal analysis of definitions is a common source of
arguments in many different legal contexts: "In interpreting statu-
tory language, words are generally given their common and ordi-
nary meaning." 88 Indeed, courts often look to dictionaries for guid-
ance when interpreting the meaning of common and ordinary
terms.89
"Component" is defined in some dictionaries as "a constituent
part" or "ingredient." 90 Based on this definition, an accused in-
fringer may argue that a "component" must be something that is
"part" of a whole, whereas something that is not physically incor-
porated into a whole cannot be viewed as a "component." One
possible analogy is that computer software is a mere template or
plan for a product, and is not a true "component" that is assembled
or incorporated into the final product, any more than the recipe for
chocolate cake is an "ingredient" of the chocolate cake.
4.2.2. Argument Two: The Legislative History of§ 271(f)
Suggests that Software Cannot Be Viewed as a
"Component"
Another possible argument for an accused infringer hoping to
limit its liability for foreign sales is to focus on the legislative his-
tory of § 271(f). The legislative history of § 271(f) shows Congress
was concerned with the domestic manufacture of items to be com-
bined overseas into a patented apparatus.91 The legislative history
of § 271(f) arguably can be interpreted to be consistent with a nar-
row construction of the word "component."
Congress enacted § 271(f) in direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. "to close a
loophole in patent law" created by that decision.92 Specifically, §
88 Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1383 (4th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
89 See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition For Students With Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def.
Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) ("We cus-
tomarily turn to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in a statute
has a plain or common meaning.").
90 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 270 (1988).
91 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828.
92 See id. (codifying patent improvement provisions, patent and trademark
office procedures, the national commission on innovation and productivity, and
miscellaneous provisions); see also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406
U.S. 518 (1972) (holding that a combination patent only protects against the oper-
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271(f) was enacted to "[to] prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. pat-
ents by supplying components of a patented product in this coun-
try so that the assembly of the components may be completed
abroad." 9
3
Focusing on the "assembly of components" language may sug-
gest that the legislature was concerned with the export of a tangi-
ble item that could be "assembled" into a whole, and not software
that is used by a computer to perform functions.94 By definition, a
template, plan, or design for a product is not assembled into the
product.
4.2.3. Argument Three: Software is a Template, Plan, or Design,
and Cannot Be Viewed as a "Component" Under § 271(0
The most interesting argument that accused infringers have
mustered in support of their efforts to prevent § 271(f) from apply-
ing to computer software is the argument that such computer code
is only a method or design. In contrast to the express concern with
the domestic manufacture of tangible components for literal as-
sembly into patented devices overseas, nothing in the legislative
history suggests that the legislature intended that the word "com-
ponent" be stretched to include templates, plans, or designs for
products.95 Consistent with its legislative history, § 271(f) gener-
ally has been applied by courts only to tangible items manufac-
tured in the United States that are to be literally assembled into a
product overseas. 9
6
able assembly of the whole within the United States, and not the manufacture and
sale of the parts).
93 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5827-28 (em-
phasis added).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that a shipment of components for a battery monitoring apparatus from
the United States was a potential basis for a claim under § 271(f) even if there was
no actual combination of the shipped components); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard
Register Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195-96 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that bringing
paper, glue, and blueprints from the United States to assemble the accused forms
in Switzerland using the paper and glue supplied from the United States consti-
tuted infringement under § 271(f); T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp.
587, 590-93 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (holding that defendants' supplying the majority of
the components from Tulsa, Oklahoma used to assemble the accused caliper pig
in Venezuela constituted infringement under § 271(f)); NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, LTD., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423, 437 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that Canadian de-
fendant's supplying physical components of email system in United States, where
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At the same time, some courts have rejected efforts to apply
§ 271(f) beyond tangible items that are to be literally incorporated
into a whole patented product overseas. For example, the court in
Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. rejected an argument that § 271(f) can
apply to devices created overseas that would infringe a U.S.
method patent, as opposed to an apparatus patent. In that case,
the court held that because there were no "components" to a pat-
ented method, § 271(f) did not apply to a method patent claim.97
Likewise, § 271(f) was held not to apply to an apparatus exported
to implement a patented process, 98 or in a situation where a U.S.-
based defendant offered to, but did not actually supply compo-
nents.99
Accused infringers may argue that § 271(f) does not apply to
software that is sent from the United States to overseas distribu-
tors. They may claim that template code from "golden masters" is
nothing more than a plan or design that enables foreign distribu-
tors to create units of software. The template code is never explic-
itly combined with any accused apparatus, and thus is not a "com-
ponent" under § 271(f).
combined with BlackBerry Relay in Canada, resulted in infringement under
§ 271(0); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320-21 (D.
Del. 1999) (finding chemicals to be components under § 271(f)); Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16895, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001) (reaching the same conclusion as in W.R.
Grace).
97 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539-40 (E.D. Va. 1998). See also Aerogroup Int'l v. Marl-
boro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
§ 271(f) is inapplicable to a design patent for a shoe sole because the patent had no
tangible "components").
98 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d. 1360, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
99 Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
There are other defensive arguments available to an accused infringer seeking to
avoid liability under § 271(f), even though not all of those arguments are related
specifically to computer software. For example, if the computer software was de-
veloped and distributed entirely outside the United States, even if the defendant
company is a United States entity, then § 271(f) might not apply. In Pellegrini v.
Analog Devices, Inc., the defendant manufactured circuit chips overseas for sale
overseas. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. CIV.A. 02-11562-RWZ, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7598, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2003) (mem.). The plaintiff argued that
because the "instruction for the disposition" of the chips comes from defendant's
U.S. headquarters, the chips came from the United States in a "metaphysical
sense." The District Court soundly rejected the argument as "more sophistry than
a fair reading of clear statutory language" and cited Rotec Industries for the propo-
sition that a claim under § 271(f) requires that the components be manufactured in
the United States. Id. at *3.
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As explained in Section 4.1, software companies routinely sup-
ply golden masters and electronic transmissions of code from the
United States to overseas distribution channels.100 The code sup-
plied from the United States is not assembled into any infringing
apparatus. Rather, it is used as a template from which units of
software are created overseas. Thus, software companies may ar-
gue that template code is only the "recipe" for the finished soft-
ware product, and not an "ingredient" of the patented product.
Accused infringers will argue that to hold a company liable
under § 271(f) would be to impose liability for supplying from the
United States something that is never actually incorporated into
the patented apparatus. They will represent this as a clear and
definite break in the case law limiting § 271(f) to situations where
the defendant is accused of supplying from the United States
something that is physically and literally incorporated into the pat-
ented apparatus.
4.3. An Alternate View: Software Must Be Viewed as a Component
Under § 271(f)
For each of the arguments seeking to avoid application of
§ 271(f) to computer software, there are counter-arguments sug-
gesting that courts should interpret § 271(f) in a way that encom-
passes computer software.
4.3.1. Argument One: The Plain Language of§ 271(0 Is
Applicable to Software that Is Part of an Infringing
Apparatus
In response to arguments regarding the literal meaning of the
word "component," companies claiming infringement argue that
§ 271(f)'s application is not limited to "tangible" components of an
infringing apparatus. Nothing in the plain language of § 271(f)
imposes a requirement of "tangibility" on any component to an
apparatus. 101 Indeed, the word "tangible" cannot be found any-
where in the statute. 102 No defendant can point to any legislative
history that limits § 271(f) to "tangible" components.
Although defendant infringers may cite cases interpreting
100 See supra Section 4.1 (examining whether computer software is a compo-
nent).
101 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
102 Id.
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§ 271(f), none holds that § 271(f) is limited to "tangible" compo-
nents of an apparatus. Cases such as W.R. Grace -Conn. & Co. v.
Intercat make clear that in contexts other than computer code, a
component need not be strictly tangible. In W.R. Grace, the defen-
dant infringer claimed that § 271(f) was limited to "components of
machines and other structural combinations," and could not apply
to the chemical compounds at issue in that case.103 The court's
holding in WR. Grace that the scope of § 271(f) is not limited to any
particular type of apparatus or component applies equally to com-
puter code:
[T]he Senate report cited by defendant nowhere states any
limitation to components of machines and other structural
combinations.... The cases cited in support of defendants'
argument are irrelevant to the case at bar. Those cases in-
volve patented processes and designs, which clearly are dif-
ferent from a "patented invention" [i.e., an apparatus]....
The plain language of the statute limits its application only
to a "component of a patented invention." Nowhere in the
statute or its legislative history is there a limitation to com-
ponents of machines and other structural combinations. A
contrary holding, refusing to apply the statute to chemical
compositions, would be tantamount to legislating addi-
tional language to a statute. That simply is not war-
ranted.104
4.3.2. Argument Two: Software Should Not Be Viewed as a Mere
Method or Design that Exists Outside § 271(J)
Plaintiffs alleging infringement will note that cases that pur-
portedly rejected various efforts to expand the scope of § 271(f) be-
yond its application to tangible items do not permit an accused in-
103 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320 n.3-4 (D. Del. 1999) (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram, 406 U.S. 518 (1972)); see also Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828 (closing the Deepsouth loophole); Standard Havens Prods., 953
F.2d 1360 (1991) (addressing argument about application of § 271(f) to method,
not apparatus, patents); Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va.
1998) (addressing argument about application of § 271(f) to method patents);
Aerogroup Int'l v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(addressing argument about application of § 271(f) to method patents).
104 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21.
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fringer to claim that computer software is a mere method or de-
sign. None of those cases apply any sort of "tangibility" require-
ment to § 271(f). Such cases relate only to method patents, and
have no application at all to apparatus patents1 05 Other cases that
accused infringers often cite merely interpret different aspects of §
271(f).106 Moreover, any attempt to analogize software to a recipe
for making a chocolate cake is inherently flawed. 07
Relevant caselaw makes clear that software to be run on a
computer system unquestionably constitutes a patentable appara-
tus. 108 The Federal Circuit has specifically rejected the argument
that computer code is somehow different from traditionally tangi-
ble inventions, and held that software code installed on a computer
constitutes a specific-purpose apparatus for purposes of patent-law
analysis:
We have held that such programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is pro-
grammed to perform particular functions pursuant to
instructions from program software .... Consequently,
a computer operating pursuant to software may repre-
sent patentable subject matter, provided, of course, that
the claimed subject matter meets all the other require-
ments of Title 35109
105 See Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (adjudicating a computer-related method pat-
ent); Aerogroup, 955 F. Supp. 220 (adjudicating a shoe sole design patent).
106 See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (stating that mere intent to export is not sufficient to impose § 271(f) liabil-
ity); Standard Havens Prods., 953 F.2d 1360 (finding that the patent at issue was not
an apparatus patent); Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. CIV.A. 02-11562-
RWZ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7598, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2003) (mem.) (sending
components from one foreign country to another, with nothing coming from the
United States, is not sufficient to impose § 271(f) liability).
107 Software is not just a recipe, but an essential component of the final prod-
uct, allowing the computer systems to communicate. Furthermore, foreign manu-
facturers do not use the software that is included on the "golden master" disks as
a "recipe" to create some new and different product. Instead, they simply copy
and distribute the software in toto. Indeed, a more accurate metaphor might in-
volve sending out a book to be photocopied.
108 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[A] computer operat-
ing pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter . .
109 Id. at 1545.
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Other cases have confirmed that a patented apparatus may in-
clude a software component."0 Indeed, the Federal Circuit specifi-
cally has explained that although some courts initially viewed pat-
ent protection for software with skepticism, the judiciary has now
recognized that software cannot be treated differently from other
patented matter:
Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a funda-
mental part of computer technology, we have had to reex-
amine the rules that govern the patentability of such tech-
nology. The sea-changes in both law and technology stand
as a testament to the ability of law to adapt to new and in-
novative concepts, while remaining true to basic princi-
ples."'
Any attempt to add a "tangibility" requirement to § 271(f) not
only ignores the clear caselaw holding that an apparatus can en-
compass a software component, but also effectively "turns back the
clock" on the evolution of patent law.
4.3.3. Argument Three: Multiple Copies of Software Code
Duplicated From a Golden Master All Should Be Viewed as
Separate Components Mhen They Are Incorporated Into
Infringing Apparatuses
Plaintiffs alleging infringement label as flawed any argument
that the software on the golden master is somehow different than
the replica that is a component of each infringing apparatus. They
also reject any argument that a software company can avoid
§ 271(f) liability for providing a component to an infringing appa-
ratus because it distributes only a limited number of golden master
copies of the infringing software to its non-U.S. distributors, then
relies on those foreign distributors to make a duplicate of the
golden master software for use in an infringing apparatus. Based
on its use of this intermediary distributor, a defendant infringer
may claim that its liability extends only to distributing the software
110 See WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (addressing an apparatus consisting of a general purpose computer and
a disclosed algorithm).
111 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
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on the golden masters, and that it is not responsible for any dupli-
cates that distributors make from these golden masters.
Plaintiffs will note that any attempt to create such a "loophole"
is particularly ironic and should be rejected because § 271(f) was
created specifically to close a similar loophole that infringing ex-
porters used to avoid liability.112 A defendant infringer cannot cite
any case in any context that supports a claim that a golden master
containing infringing software is any different from an exact dupli-
cate of the infringing software that is generated from that golden
master.
4.3.4. Argument Four: § 271(0 Should Apply to a Method
Described in a Patent, So Long as Some Tangible Device
Results
An accused infringer may cite to Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., to
support the argument that a method or design patent can never
trigger § 271(f).113 A plaintiff alleging infringement may reply that
the patents at issue in Enpat involved only a general method or
process claim, not software to be installed on a computer. Enpat's
patent claims did not describe any physical apparatus that used the
method. Accordingly, when Enpat raised an infringement claim
pursuant to § 271(f), the court found that Enpat's method claim did
not involve any components, as contemplated by the language of
§ 271(f).114 The court therefore ruled that Enpat could not state an
infringement claim under § 271(f).115
Enpat involved only a method patent and did not involve any
apparatus patent claims. Enpat's patent "describes the steps re-
quired to accomplish a particular task rather than the composition
of a patented physical product." 116 By contrast, a patent that in-
cludes both a method patent and an apparatus patent should with-
stand scrutiny. To the extent that a patent involves apparatus
claims, Enpat's holding is entirely inapplicable.
112 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) ("To
the degree that the inventor needs protection in markets other than those of this
country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a congressional intent to
have him seek it abroad through patents secured in countries where his goods are
being used.").
113 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998).
114 Id. at 539.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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Moreover, if it includes an apparatus claim, a patent is factually
and legally distinct from the patent at issue in Enpat. Enpat and all
the cases it cites are based on patents that describe only theoretical
methods without describing any specific physical construct.117 In-
deed, the court in Enpat specifically based its ruling on the fact that
no physical construct was described by the Enpat patent: "Like the
asphalt process in Standard Havens or the shoe design in Aerogroup,
plaintiffs' patent describes the steps required to accomplish a par-
ticular task rather than the composition of a patented physical
product.""
8
A patent that does not simply describe a method in the abstract
but instead relates to how that method must be used to link two or
more computers should trigger § 271(f). Such a patent may de-
scribe exactly the sort of "composition of a patented physical
product" that the Enpat court approved." 9
5. COURTS BEGIN TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE OVER § 271(F)
Although both § 271(f) and computer software have been
around for many years, no court has applied one to the other until
recently. In the space of less than two weeks in 2003, two different
federal district courts independently addressed the proper inter-
pretation of a "component" under § 271(f) in the context of com-
puter software.
5.1. Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.
In Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., Judge Hudson of the East-
ern District of Virginia issued a decision that interpreted § 271(f)
and its application in cases involving computer software. 120 This
litigation involved claims by Imagexpo which alleged that Micro-
soft's "NetMeeting" software, which is widely distributed with
Microsoft's operating system, infringed Imagexpo's patent.121 The
117 See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (adjudicating a patented asphalt-making process); Aerogroup
Int'l, Inc. v. Malboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (adjudicat-
ing a patented design for shoe soles).
118 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
119 Id.
120 See Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.3:02CV751, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug 19, 2003) (adjudicating Microsoft's motion
in limine to bar Imagexpo from seeking damages on units of NetMeeting made
outside the United States).
121 Id. at *3-4.
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Imagexpo patent described an apparatus linking two or more
computers via software.122 Judge Hudson was faced with Micro-
soft's motion in limine seeking to prevent Imagexpo from present-
ing evidence of Microsoft's foreign sales to a jury. In essence,
Microsoft was trying to avoid damages for "infringing units" that
were made outside the United States.
Microsoft had been "exporting" its NetMeeting software over-
seas by developing the software in the United States, then shipping
golden masters containing the software to foreign locations for rep-
lication, and ultimately incorporating it into its customers' com-
puters.123 Microsoft's overseas agents would duplicate the golden
master software and ship it to Microsoft's customers. Microsoft's
argument in its motion in limine was that these golden masters, and
by extension computer software generally, cannot be viewed as a
"component" for purposes of § 271(f). Microsoft therefore argued
that the jury could not award any damages based on the copies of
NetMeeting software that were distributed in overseas markets. 24
Judge Hudson rejected Microsoft's argument that its Net-
Meeting golden masters are mere templates or designs, like those
at issue in Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. and other similar cases.125
Judge Hudson recognized that computer software is fundamen-
tally different from a method or design:
Imagexpo's position is that the "golden master," or tem-
plate, at issue in this case actually involves an information-
or code-base which becomes an integral ingredient in the
finished computer product. In other words, the overseas
replicator does not simply construct the computer product
using a plan, design, or recipe supplied by Microsoft. In-
stead, the functional nucleus of the finished computer
122 See U.S. Patent No. 5,206,934 (issued Apr. 27, 1993) ("The invention relates
to computer networks and communication systems. In particular, the invention
relates to a method and apparatus incorporating a computer program for imple-
menting collaborative conferencing between two or more users.").
123 See supra Section 4.1 (discussing how golden masters commonly are used
in the computer software industry).
124 See Imagexpo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *4-7 (describing Microsoft's
argument).
125 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) (involving software design). See also
Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(involving a design for a shoe sole); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor In-
dus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (involving an asphalt-making process).
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product is driven by the code, which is transmitted through
the "golden master." Simply put, according to Imagexpo,
Microsoft's role in the production process is active rather
than passive. The template is, therefore, a component.
The Court is of the opinion that the "golden master" and
the electronic codes supplied by Microsoft to its overseas
representatives constitute "components" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f).126
As a result, Judge Hudson denied Microsoft's request for an
order in limine and permitted the jury to award damages based on
the units of NetMeeting installed on computers overseas.
127
After its motion in limine was denied, Microsoft subsequently
asked Judge Hudson to reconsider his ruling, arguing that a recent
Federal Circuit decision in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmacies, Inc.128 re-
quired a reversal of his prior ruling. In Bayer AG, the Federal Cir-
cuit had interpreted the language of § 271(g), the import provision,
and the legislative history behind it, to hold that § 271(g) is re-
stricted to tangible goods and "applies only to physical goods and
that information is not included." 129 Significantly, Microsoft was
joined in its request for reconsideration in an amicus brief filed by
Intel Corporation and America Online, Inc.130 In the end, Judge
Hudson was not swayed by Microsoft's new argument and denied
Microsoft's motion for reconsideration from the bench immediately
after oral argument on the issue. 131
126 Imagexpo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *8-9.
127 Id. At trial, Imagexpo introduced inter alia evidence of foreign sales, to
which the jury responded with specific findings of both domestic and foreign in-
fringement. See Jury Verdict Form, Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.
3:02CV751 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2003) (on file with Journal) (detailing jury's unani-
mous findings); see also Jury Finds Microsoft Infringed; $62.3 Million Awarded In
Damages, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP., Dec. 1, 2003, at 1 (discussing Imagexpo
verdict); Jury Awards $62.3 Million Against Microsoft for Infringement of Net Confer-
encing Patent, BNA's PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Nov. 28, 2003, at 71 (dis-
cussing Imagexpo verdict).
128 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
129 Id. at 1371.
130 Amicus Brief, supra note 17.
131 See Hearing Transcript, Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.3:02
CV751 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2003) (on file with Journal) (denying Microsoft's motion
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5.2. Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
Coincidentally, within ten days of Judge Hudson's decision in
Imagexpo L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., Judge Zagel of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois issued a very similar ruling against Microsoft in Eo-
las Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,132 which also interpreted
§ 271(f) in the context of computer software.
In Eolas, much like in Imagexpo, Microsoft was accused of in-
fringing on a software patent. One of Microsoft's pretrial motions
requested that Judge Zagel bar the plaintiffs from seeking damages
for units produced and sold outside the United States. Again like
in Imagexpo, Microsoft's motion was based on § 271(f), and Micro-
soft was arguing that the software code on Microsoft's golden mas-
ters 133 could not be viewed as a "component" for purposes of
§ 271(f).
Judge Zagel found the most analogous cases to be those involv-
ing application of § 271(f) in non-mechanical contexts like chemical
compounds. Specifically, Judge Zagel cited W. R. Grace & Co. -
Conn. v. Intercat, Inc.' 34 and Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp.135 in which
"defendants sent chemical products abroad that were combined as
supplied with other compounds into compositions that would
have infringed had the combination occurred here." 136
Just like Judge Hudson in Imagexpo, Judge Zagel in Eolas found
that a golden master containing computer software code is not
merely a recipe or template for components of an apparatus, but
rather a component for purposes of § 271(f) because exact dupli-
cates of its software code are incorporated as an "operating ele-
ment" of the ultimate device. 37 Judge Zagel drew a potent distinc-
tion between duplicating the software code on Microsoft's golden
master and merely using a recipe or template to crease some new
component: "A chemical formula can be memorized (as many
complex recipes are) and discarded. The source code has to be in-
for reconsideration).
132 Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99C626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13482, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003).
133 See supra Section 4.1 (discussing how manufacturers send their products
outside the United States by using "golden masters" and how the "golden mas-
ter" relates to the manufacturing process).
134 60 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Del 1999).
135 696 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
136 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13482, at *4-5.
137 Id. at *5-6.
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stalled, never to be discarded." 138 Judge Zagel acknowledged that
a "philosophical argument" can be mounted about whether com-
puter source code can be viewed as a mere recipe,139 but he found
that for all practical purposes, software is a functioning component
of any computer:
Where code is installed on a disk or a hard drive to be put
into a programmable machine, I conclude that source code
in a computer product like my laptop is, in law, the legal
equivalent of a piece of computer hardware and not the le-
gal equivalent of a chemical formula.
In a legal sense, a source code is a made part of a computer
product. In contrast, a chemical formula is discovered
rather than made, and is not part of any product.
140
After Judge Zagel ruled that § 271(f) is applicable to computer
software, Microsoft moved for reconsideration, just as it had in Im-
agexpo, claiming that the recent Federal Circuit decision in Bayer
141
had effectively overruled Judge Zagel's prior ruling.142 On recon-
sideration in Eolas, however, Judge Zagel rejected Microsoft's ar-
guments based on Bayer, and reaffirmed his interpretation of
§ 271(f):
At the heart of Microsoft's argument is its assertion that the
source code contained on the "golden master" is merely in-
tangible information.... I disagree. The source code con-
138 Id.
139 Id. at *7-8.
140 Id. at *8. On his use of the word "discovered," Judge Zagel further ac-
knowledged that "[a] philosopher would find it difficult to draw the line between
'making' and 'discovering' a thing but judges are obliged to draw such lines. The
judges job is made a little (but not much) easier because we render our decision
based on the way in which a thing is used." Id. at *7 n.1.
141 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1373-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(determining that the legislative history behind the "Process Patents Amendments
Act" contains nothing that would preclude intangible information from the statu-
tory scheme).
142 Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc., No. 99C0626, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 534,
at *14 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2004).
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tained on the "golden master" is not intangible information
but is instead a real and substantial part of the final prod-
uct. Because I find that the source code present on the
"golden master" is not intangible information, Bayer does
not affect my decision.
143
6. CONCLUSION
While the Imagexpo and Eolas rulings offer a consistent frame-
work, the Federal Circuit has not yet provided controlling guid-
ance on the relationship between § 271(f) and the export of com-
puter software. An appeal of either Imagexpo or Eolas would
provide such a procedural opportunity. The Imagexpo case reached
final settlement soon after the jury rendered a $62.3 million verdict
in Imagexpo's favor, thus ending the litigation1 " and any possible
appeal.
As to an appeal in Eolas, many software industry leaders
sharply criticized the USPTO's issuance of the Eolas patent post-
trial. 45 Citing a "substantial outcry from a widespread segment of
the affected industry," the USPTO announced that it would com-
mence reexamination of the Eolas patent. 46 If the Eolas patent
143 Id.
144 Approximately six weeks after trial, Imagexpo and Microsoft announced
settlement of the case, the terms of which included payment to Imagexpo of $60
million by Microsoft. See Mark Veverka, Software: the Likely Winner of '04,
BARRON'S, at T2, col. 4 (Jan. 5, 2004) (reporting Microsoft's $60 million settlement
with SPX, the parent of Imagexpo).
145 Steve Lohr, Web Group Backs Microsoft in Patent Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2003, at C6. See also Letter from Tim Berners-Lee (often credited with inventing
the World Wide Web) to James E. Rogan, then-USPTO Director and Undersecre-
tary of Commerce for Intellectual Property (Oct. 28, 2003) (expressing substantial
concern regarding the validity and impact of the Eolas patent), available at
http://www.w3.org/2003/10/27-rogan.html.
146 The order signed by Stephen G. Kunin, Deputy Commissioner of the
USPTO, was issued on October 30, 2003. Director Ordered Reexamination No.
5,838,906, 1276 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 129 (Nov. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ patents/patog/week47/OG/TOC.htm. The statu-
tory and regulatory basis for such actions is found at 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) ("On his
own initiative, and any time, the Director may determine whether a substantial
new question of patentability is raised by patents and publications discovered by
him or cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title") and 37 C.F.R. § 1.520
("The Director may initiate ex parte reexamination without a request for reexami-
nation pursuant to § 1.510 or § 1.913. Normally requests from outside the Office
that the Director undertake reexamination on his own initiative will not be con-
sidered."). The patent remains enforceable during the reexamination period. U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL FOR PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
2211, R. 14.2(d).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
does not survive the USPTO's reexamination process, as some
commentators predict,147 Eolas will have no patent rights for Mi-
crosoft to have infringed, and by implication no case in contro-
versy for appeal regarding infringement damages for export activi-
ties. 4
8
Imagexpo's seminal importance to § 271(f) extends beyond just
computer software to any patent that primarily relies on the trans-
fer of information as a component, such as those involving gene
sequences and self-replicating cell lines.149 Given the absence of
near-term opportunities for the Federal Circuit to address the
nexus between § 271(f) and computer software, Judge Hudson's
ruling in Imagexpo stands as the brightest beacon of light in what-
ever interpretative fog is deemed to exist. Given the incontroverti-
ble economic impact of this subject to export activities,15 0 assuredly
147 During the initial reexamination process, the USPTO rejected all claims of
Eolas' patent. Browser Patent Infringed by Microsoft Is Rejected in PTO Reexamination
Action, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), at 417 (Mar. 12, 2004); Rejection of
Patent is Hailed as Step Toward Resolving Suit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at B4. Eolas
has time to respond and can still appeal any final decision made by the Patent Ex-
aminer. As for long term prospects of the Eolas patent surviving, one commenta-
tor boldly stated that "'[i]t sounds like the Patent Office is taking appropriate
steps to sanity-check the validity of a patent that is obvious to anybody that's ever
built software' . . . ." John P. Mello, Jr., Feds to Take a Second Look at Web Crippler
Patent, E-COMMERCE TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2003 (quoting Ted Schadler, an analyst with
Forrester, a technology research company in Boston), at http://www.ecommerce
times.com/perl/story/32131.html. "I can only imagine what the prior art search
looked like for this idea, but it surely missed the vast bulk of work that had been
going on since at least 1995." Id.
148 If the Eolas patent survives, Microsoft has vowed to appeal the Eolas deci-
sion to the Federal Circuit. John R. Wilke, Microsoft Changes Browser to Comply
with Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2004, at A8.
149 One particularly likely area of application is in the field of bioinformatics,
because the export of gene sequences and self-replicating cell lines present very
similar issues as those raised in Imagexpo. See Symposium on Biolnformatics and In-
tellectual Property Law, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 218, 219-221 (2002) (questioning
whether § 271(f) could apply to bioinformatics patents).
150 Some major U.S. companies have claimed that applying § 271(f) to com-
puter software could have serious unintended policy implications. See, e.g.,
Amicus Brief, supra note 17 (claiming "serious and unintended consequences for
the American software industry and other industries in which masters, molds or
templates are exported overseas," including the possibility that such companies
.may consider relocating their design and development facilities outside the
United States," the "further cost on United States high-technology companies for
doing business in the United States," and the "disadvantage [as compared to]
their overseas competition"). Other commentators have suggested that §§ 271(f)
and 2 71(g) are improper trade barriers. See, e.g., Anthony D. Sabatelli, Impediments
to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579, 585-86 (1995) (noting that
"attempts by the United States to achieve extraterritorial control and enforcement
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one day it will be before the Federal Circuit.'
5 '
of intellectual property rights have been viewed as trade barriers by the interna-
tional community"). However, in light of the European Union's recent moves to
codify stringent standards for obtaining software patents, U.S. companies combat-
ing patent infringement in Europe may see § 271(f) as their best tool. See Matthew
Newman, EU Panel Moves on Patent Law, WALL. ST. J., Jun. 18, 2003 (discussing the
potential implications of proposals to tighten EU software patent rules). But see
Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 80 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523 (1998) (predicting development of a global sys-
tem of intellectual property rights).
151 A recent post-Imagexpo and post-Eolas opinion suggests that some jurists
are just as eager as some major corporations for the Federal Circuit to address
§ 271(f). In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Judge Pauley of the Southern District of
New York confronted the very same § 271(f) issues, interestingly enough in yet
another case where Microsoft was sued for patent infringement. Judge Pauley re-
lied heavily on Imagexpo and Eolas, and followed their conclusion that software
replicated abroad is a component for purposes of § 271(f). At the outset of his
opinion, Judge Pauley recognized the "profound ramifications" this ruling pre-
sents for software manufacturers, and noted that "the issue of liability under Sec-
tion 271(f) for foreign replication of infringing software supplied from the United
States is a question of law ripe for review by the Federal Circuit." 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3340, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
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